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UKRAINIAN–HUNGARIAN COEXISTENCE IN
TRANSCARPATHIA BASED
ON THE ‘TANDEM 2016’ SURVEY

Abstract: In recent years, significant social and economic changes have taken place in Ukraine, and in Transcarpathia too, which have influenced the development of the national-ethnic identity of the locals and the inter-ethnic relations as well. The target group of the TANDEM 2016 sociological survey was the Ukrainian majority and the Hungarian minority within the multinational population of Transcarpathia (covering 92.6% of its total population). The survey investigated questions related to ethnic coexistence, such as the identification patterns of the region’s population, attachment to Ukrainian and Hungarian citizenship, language knowledge, ethnic space perception, discrimination, and the evaluation of Hungary’s policy towards Transcarpathia.

At the national level, the Euromaidan movement¹ and the prolonged war situation in Eastern Ukraine have resulted in a severe economic downturn. The consequences of the decline have been experienced by the inhabitants of the Transcarpathian County of Western Ukraine too. This has directly resulted in the intensification of emigration. The inhabitants emigrate, on the one hand, to not be involved in the war, i.e. to escape drafting. On the other hand, the unprecedentedly hopeless economic situation and the inability of securing a living also appear among the push factors.² Meanwhile, the law on simplified

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- 1 Euromaidan became the name of the pro-Europe protest wave that started on 21 November 2013, at the Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti) in Kiev. The protest was triggered directly by the postponement of the signing of Ukraine’s EU Association Agreement. Demonstrations for European integration have gradually become anti-government protests, and they have also caused many casualties. As a result of the demonstration series, in February 2014, the then Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovich, finally resigned. See, for example: Volodymyr Kulyk, “Ukrainian Nationalism Since the Outbreak of Euromaidan,” *Ab Imperio* no. 3 (2014): 94–122.
 - 2 Patrik Tátrai, Ágnes Eröss and Katalin Kovály, “Migráció és versengő nemzetpolitikák Kárpátalján az Euromajdan után [Migration and competing national policies in Transcarpathia after Euromaidan],” *Regio* no. 3 (2016): 82–110.

naturalization adopted by Hungary in 2010³—taken into account the worsening local conditions—opened up new perspectives for the Transcarpathians, and many of the local Hungarians obtained Hungarian citizenship. The practical implications of citizenship (e.g., obtaining an EU passport) are at least as important in this process as is the symbolic value of the recognition of Hungarians by enabling them to obtain Hungarian citizenship. In this difficult period, several other support programs have been launched by the kin-state specifically to help the Transcarpathian Hungarians. These programs have reinforced the positive attitude of Transcarpathian Hungarians towards Hungary, and as a result, the level of commitment to Hungarian culture, as well as the prestige of Hungarian institutions and Hungarian language has changed compared to the previous years.

The target group of the TANDEM 2016 sociological survey was the Ukrainian majority and the Hungarian minority within the multinational population of Transcarpathia (covering 92.6% of its total population).⁴ The paper-based questionnaire survey was conducted in May–August 2016 on the basis of a representative sample in 74 Transcarpathian settlements. The survey was bilingual: a total of 1212 adult informants were interviewed, 398 of them in Hungarian, and 814 in Ukrainian. The survey was aimed at the economically active age group (18–64 years) of the Ukrainian and Hungarian population in Transcarpathia.⁵

The telling name (TANDEM) expresses that in the research we were particularly interested in the characteristics of the Ukrainian–Hungarian coexistence. The two sub-samples were determined by the language of the questionnaire, and since both the Hungarian and the Ukrainian questionnaires contained similar topics, the TANDEM 2016 is unique among the sociological researches conducted in Transcarpathia as the results are comparable in the Ukrainian–Hungarian context.

The questionnaire contained a total of 90 questions, covering eight major topics. In addition to (1) the general socio-demographic data, we asked questions about (2) the identity,

3 Act XLIV of 2010 amending Act LV of 1993 on the Hungarian Nationality. See also the website of simplified naturalization: <http://allampolgarsag.gov.hu/>

4 Based on the 2001 census data. See József Molnár and István Molnár D., *Kárpátalja népessége és magyarsága a népszámlálási és népmozgalmi adatok tükrében. (Population of Transcarpathia and Hungarians in the light of census and population movements)*. (Uzhgorod: Poliprint, 2005).

5 The survey is the result of the collaboration of six research institutes. The Research Institute for Hungarian Communities Abroad, the Ferenc Rákóczi II. Transcarpathian Hungarian Institute, the Antal Hodinka Linguistic Research Center, Lehoczky Tivadar Social Sciences Research Center, and the Momentum Doctorandus Civil Organization jointly coordinated the research, while the fieldwork among the Ukrainian population was organized by the Department of Sociology and Social Work of the National University of Uzhgorod and the Carpathian Public Opinion Research Center.

(3) the inter-ethnic relations, (4) the language use, (5) the religious attachment and other values of the informants, (6) the evaluation of Hungary's support policy towards Transcarpathia, (7) the social well-being and political participation of the Transcarpathians, and (8) the migration intentions of the informants.

In this paper, we focus on the questions concerning identity and language use, as well as on the image of the two nations of the other and the inter-ethnic relations. In addition, our goal is to compare our results with the data of a comprehensive sociological study previously conducted on the Transcarpathian Hungarian population, the 2007 Carpathian Panel research,⁶ and thus to examine the changes of the last 10 years.

Multiple identities at individual and community level

When asked about their nationality, informants could choose from five pre-defined ethnic categories or could give their own answer to the open question "other". 84% of those completing the Ukrainian-language questionnaire said that their nationality is Ukrainian, 13% said it is Hungarian, 1% said it is Russian, 1% said it is Rusyn, 0.4% said it is Roma and 1% said it is other. The majority (89%) of the Hungarian sub-sample declared themselves to be of Hungarian nationality, 10% of Ukrainian nationality, 0.3% of Russian nationality, and 0.3% of Roma nationality. We found that there is no uncertainty in the question of nationality in the Ukrainian sub-sample, but at the same time, 0.3% of those who filled out the Hungarian survey did not classify themselves according to nationality.

6 Eleonóra Molnár and Ildikó Orosz, "Kárpát Panel – Kárpátalja gyorsjelentés 2007 (Carpathian Panel – Instant Report on Transcarpathia 2007)," in: *Kárpát Panel 2007. Gyorsjelentés, A Kárpát-medencei magyarok helyzete és perspektívái (Carpathian Panel 2007. Instant Report, The Situation and Perspectives of Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin)*, eds. Attila Papp Z. and Valér Veres (Budapest: HAS Institute for Minority Research, 2007), 185–243, 189–190.

Nationality	Ukrainian sub-sample % (N = 814)	Hungarian sub-sample % (N = 398)
Ukrainian	83.8	10.1
Hungarian	12.5	89.1
Gypsy	0.4	0.3
Rusyn	1.1	0.3
Russian	1.1	-
Other	1.1	-
Does not know / did not answer	-	0.3
Total	100	100

*Table 1. Nationality distribution of the Ukrainian and Hungarian sub-samples
(based on first mention, %)*

Table 1. shows that in both sub-samples there is a group representing more than 10% of the subsample within which the interrogator's external (i.e. the assumption that the national identity of the informant is identical with the language of the questionnaire) and the internal identification of the respondent did not coincide. In the case of the Hungarian sub-sample, the interrogator identified the respondent as Hungarian, and the questionnaire was conducted in Hungarian, but 40 people (10%) said that their nationality is Ukrainian.⁷ In the case of the Ukrainian sub-sample, there were also 102 people (13%) who, despite the external identification as Ukrainian and the query in Ukrainian, declared themselves to be of Hungarian nationality in the first place.

⁷ The difficulty of interpreting the nationality as a category can be a partial explanation for this phenomenon, which was also highlighted by the qualitative research of Hires-László among the Hungarians of Beregszász. According to that research, because of the more formal context of the research, citizenship also appears in the answers to question on nationality. In the Soviet era, the identity card served as a reference on this issue because it included the nationality besides the citizenship as well, but the practice ended in the Ukrainian era. In addition, there is a strong uncertainty among respondents about which of the different attachments (citizenship, origin, mother tongue or national feelings) they should choose when answering this question. Kornélia Hires-László, "Etnikai kategóriák a beregszásziak mindennapi diskurzusaiban. (Ethnic categories in the everyday discourses of people from Beregovo)," in *Többsz nyelvűség, regionalitás, nyelvoktatás (Multilingualism, regionalism, language teaching)*, eds. Anita Márku and Enikő Tóth (Uzhgorod: RIK-U, 2017), 121–136.

Although we were obviously dealing with bilingual data providers in the case of this 10%, it is not typical for the vast majority of the informants to speak well the language of the other nation. In Figure 1., we can see that both the Ukrainians and the Hungarians speak the language of their nationality almost on a native level; on the scale provided for this question, 6 represented the level of mother tongue. However, there is a significant difference ($p \leq 0,000$) between the levels of familiarity with each other's language. Those who identify as Hungarians speak the Ukrainian language better (on the scale of 6, their result is close to 4, which means they speak the language with minor errors) than the Ukrainians speak the Hungarian language (for them the average is 2, which means they understand but do not speak the language).




Figure 1: Ukrainian and Hungarian language proficiency according to primary national attachment (values obtained on a six-degree scale, where 1 = does not understand or speak the language, 6 = mother tongue)

Considering the above language proficiency among the Ukrainian and Hungarian population of Transcarpathia, the dialogue between the two groups is not excluded, although it could be improved qualitatively. To find out how open the locals are towards each other, we asked them if the opportunity was given, would they improve their current Hungarian/Ukrainian language skills. The diagram below (Figure 2.) shows that almost every second Ukrainian (49%) would like to know Hungarian better and a significant proportion of Hungarians (41%) think likewise about learning Ukrainian. The difference between the two groups is to be found in the ratio of those who are uncertain: about a fifth (21%) of the

Ukrainian sub-sample did not take a position on this issue, perhaps never thought about it, or it is not relevant for them.





Figure 2: Likelihood to improve one's current Hungarian/Ukrainian language skills (% , N = 1199)

Another important indicator of the value of languages is what languages our informants think are useful for the future success of their children (Figure 3.). There is a significant difference ($p \leq 0,000$) between the Ukrainian and Hungarian samples for three languages. Both groups think that their own language is more important than the language of the other, in addition to the fact that for the Ukrainians the Hungarian language is less important than for the Hungarians the Ukrainian language (although they are at the two extremes of the same value, 4, which stood for “important”).

We can also see in the figure that English is also important for both groups when thinking about the generation of the future, but Russian language is no longer clearly important (value 3 – “it is important, but not so important”). There is also a significant difference in the evaluation of the Russian language between the Hungarian and Ukrainian sub-samples, and according to the data, this language is more important for the Ukrainians when considering the future success of their children.



*Figure 3: How important are the following languages for your child's future success? (values obtained on a five-point scale, where 1 - not at all important, 5 - very important, * significant difference)*

In addition to indicating their nationalities, informants could also say whether they have multiple attachments. Multiple identity is a natural state that is present in every minority, especially if minority existence has existed for several generations. According to Bindorffer, dual identity is an identity construct that embraces, internalizes, and emotionally experiences those elements of the majority ethnic national identity that are missing or only partially found in the set of their ethnic identity.⁸ In the total sample of TANDEM 2016 research, the overwhelming majority (81%) indicated only a single identity, while 227 people (19%) used the option of dual attachment. Within this, it is interesting to note that in the Ukrainian sub-sample there are more people with dual attachments: 21% said they had dual nationality, while only 15% of the Hungarian sub-sample did so.

Ukrainian (57%) and Russian identity (10%) were ranked second among those Hungarians who indicated to have multiple identities (Table 2.). In the Ukrainian sub-sample, we find a more polarized picture: 28% indicated Hungarian, 14% Russian, 14% Rusyn, 2% Roma and 5% other (Slovak, Romanian, Latvian and “Transcarpathian”) as their secondary identities.

8 Györgyi Bindorffer, “Etnikai, nemzeti és kétnemzeti identitás. Előszó (Ethnic, National and Two-National Identity. Preface),” in *Változatok a kettős identitásra (Variations on dual identity)*, ed. Györgyi Bindorffer (Budapest: HAS Institute for Minority Research, 2007), 7–15. Retrieved from: <http://kisebbssegkutato.tk.mta.hu/uploads/files/archive/355.pdf>; Time of download: November 20, 2017

Nationality	Ukrainian sub-sample % (N = 167)	Hungarian sub-sample % (N = 60)
Ukrainian	37	57
Hungarian	28	33
Gypsy	2	-
Rusyn	14	-
Russian	14	10
Other	5	-
Total	100	100

*Table 2: Nationality distribution of the Ukrainian and the Hungarian sub-samples
(based on secondary choice, %)*

Due to the limitations of the number of informants, we were able to examine the reasons only in the Ukrainian sub-sample, and there we found that there is a significant correlation between the knowledge of the language of the other nation and the identification of dual attachment: that is, the better the person speaks the other's language, the more frequent it is that they indicate dual identity. Similarly, family heritage has an effect on dual attachment: 54% of those with a Hungarian mother in the Ukrainian sub-sample, and 57% of those with a Hungarian father have dual identity. Dual attachment is more frequent among informants coming from mixed marriages than among informants from homogeneous marriages.⁹

National-ethnic attachment can be interpreted not only at the personal level of the informants but also at the broader, community level. The survey included a question about the opinion of the Ukrainian and Hungarian respondents whether the Transcarpathian Hungarians belong to the Hungarian nation, to the Ukrainian nation, or to both. In the

⁹ The effect of these background factors in the Hungarian sub-sample could not be examined due to the low number of items.

2007 Carpathian Panel research, 78% of the respondents thought that the Transcarpathian Hungarians were part of the Hungarian nation, and 52% said that the Transcarpathian Hungarians could also be considered part of the Ukrainian nation. The proportion of those who thought that Hungarians belonged to both nations was 45%.¹⁰ The TANDEM 2016 research included a similar question,¹¹ and according to the answers given in the Hungarian sample, only 35% of the respondents, and only 13% of the Ukrainian sub-sample think that the Transcarpathian Hungarians are part of the Hungarian nation. The dual attachment is a more popular option: in the Hungarian sub-sample, 59% believe that the Transcarpathian Hungarians belong to both nations, while half of the respondents in the Ukrainian sub-sample are also of this opinion. It is an interesting experience that while only 19% indicated at the level of individual identities that they belong to both nations, it has already appeared in previous year's researches and in the current research as well that, at the community level, more than half of the informants do so.

“Being Transcarpathian” as a shared characteristic

The questionnaire contained questions not only about the informants' national identity (Ukrainian, Russian, Hungarian, Rusyn, etc.), but it also provided the opportunity to place their identity in a subtler dimension. In this part of the questionnaire, besides the previously mentioned nationality categories, our informants were able to choose from “identities” defined by citizenship and geographic areas. Examining the question in breakdown of the language of the questionnaire, the question was compared only with those identity categories where the ratio of respondents reached 1% at least in one of the sub-samples (Figure 4).

10 Molnár and Orosz, “Kárpát Panel – Kárpátalja,” 190, 199.

11 Unlike the Carpathian Panel, the TANDEM research asked about the national belonging of Transcarpathian Hungarians by listing a number of options in a single question (belong to the Hungarian nation, belong to the Ukrainian nation, or belong to both nations). Thus, the difference between the data of the two researches may be due to the different methodology.




Figure 4: I consider myself to be a ...
(N = 1201, broken down by sub-samples, %)

As far as the identity of Transcarpathian Hungarians is concerned, previous researches have always shown a very strong local attachment in their identity to Transcarpathia. Local identity means segregation within a larger category or within a national group, and with geographic boundaries. In other words, it can be assumed that when the informants define themselves as Transcarpathian Hungarians, they also separate themselves from the other Hungarian groups in their identity, and they attach this special group belonging to a geographic location. The Carpathian Panel research states: “*The identity of Hungarians in Transcarpathia is characterized by the duality that can be described as the “Transcarpathian Hungarian”; almost half of the respondents, 45 percent selected this category, and 30 percent of them included “Hungarian” in their self-determination. Duality means that they consider themselves not only Hungarian and not only Transcarpathian, but Transcarpathian Hungarian.*”¹² Similarly, an interview-based identity research in Transcarpathia also concluded with the importance of local identity.¹³

This regional attachment seems to be confirmed in the TANDEM 2016 research.

12 Molnár and Orosz, “Kárpát Panel – Kárpátalja,” 189.

13 Kornélia Hires-László, “Az öreg fát már nagyon nehéz kivágni.” *A nemzeti és lokális identitás faktorai az ezredfordulón a kárpátaljai magyar közösségben* [“It is very difficult to cut down an old tree.” Factors of national and local identity at the turn of the millennium in the Hungarian community in Transcarpathia.] (Uzhgorod: PoliPrint, 2010).

Although the value choices in the Hungarian and in the Ukrainian sub-samples differ significantly in terms of community affinity ($p \leq 0.000$), the importance of regionalism seems to be a common ground. The largest group of Hungarian respondents is represented by 39% of the informants who are characterized by the previously mentioned duality, i.e. who consider themselves as Transcarpathian Hungarians. In addition, there are also significant proportions of informants who consider themselves only Hungarian (28%) or only Transcarpathian (19%). Regional attachment to Transcarpathia is also significant (25%) in the Ukrainian sub-sample, but most of them (44%) feel that they belong to the Ukrainian nation.

In addition to regionalism, it is interesting to look at the categories of citizenship as well. From the point of view of the Hungarian minority, it is particularly interesting how much Ukrainian citizenship acquired by birth, and how much Hungarian citizenship alone or as the element of dual citizenship as a status, appear among the building blocks of identity, i.e. how attractive they are in the identification. In the regional report of the Carpathian Panel,¹⁴ Molnár and Orosz concluded about this question that *“for Transcarpathian Hungarians it is an axiomatic status that they are of Hungarian nationality, but Ukrainian citizens. That is, the two concepts are separated from the point of view of their self-identification, which is also due to the fact that much of the interviewed generation used to be Soviet citizen, thus nationality and citizenship are two different things in their minds.”* In the 2007 survey, 10% of the respondents indicated that they were Ukrainian citizens with Hungarian mother tongue.

In 2013, focus group discussions on the simplified Hungarian citizenship also examined how citizenship-related identity relates to the minorities' already existing attachments.¹⁵ The research found that Hungarian citizenship also generates new identity elements, but these are embedded in the earlier structure of minority identity, and do not completely overwrite previous attachments. It is a realistic risk that while the new Hungarian citizenship strengthens attachments to the motherland and to the Hungarian nation, it can have the opposite effect on the ties to the local communities and to the Ukrainian state, the latter also incorporating the homeland. At the same time, the qualitative analysis pointed out that the minority ethnocentrism of the Hungarian communities abroad as well as the majority ethnocentrism of the Hungarians in Hungary counteract this process.¹⁶

14 Molnár and Orosz, “Kárpát Panel – Kárpátalja,” 189.

15 Attila Papp Z., “Kisebbségi identitáskonstrukciók a kettős magyar állampolgárság által (Minority identity constructs through dual citizenship),” *Regio* no. 1. (2014): 118–155.

16 Papp Z., “Kisebbségi,” 149–150.

In the Carpathian Panel research about 10% said that the description “Hungarian-speaking Ukrainian citizen” fitted them best.¹⁷ According to our data from 2016, Ukrainian citizenship is a primary identity factor of only 2% of the informants, but two new categories appeared: Hungarian citizen with 2%, and Ukrainian–Hungarian dual citizen with 6%.

As for the Ukrainian sub-sample, only 5% of them defined themselves as Ukrainian citizens. It is a surprising result that the proportion of those who consider themselves to be Ukrainian–Hungarian dual citizens is only slightly lower (3%).¹⁸

Where is home?

It is already clear from the results described above that for Transcarpathians, attachment to the region is important regardless of ethnicity. Our questionnaire contained further questions to help us grasp the geographical aspects of identity. We asked, for example, what our informants consider to be their home.¹⁹

Earlier researches, such as the Carpathian Panel, pointed out that almost every second Transcarpathian Hungarian (45% of the respondents) considers the narrower region, Transcarpathia, as the embodiment of their home, and only 27% considers the country, Ukraine, to be their home. Hungary (11.6%) and historic Hungary (4.9%) was selected by 16.5% of respondents as their home in 2007, which could have been one of the results of the referendum on December 5, 2004,²⁰ but could have also reflected the differences between the two countries in terms of social development. Strong attachments appeared

17 Molnár and Orosz, “Kárpát Panel – Kárpátalja,” 189.


18 In the case of the Ukrainian sub-sample, another question revealed that 33% of them have a positive attitude towards the Hungarian citizenship of Transcarpathians, another 36% are indifferent and 14% would apply for it if they were eligible. The conditions for Hungarian citizenship are: the candidate has to prove that someone was a Hungarian citizen among his ancestors, and they have to prove their Hungarian language skills.

19 Contrary to the established sociological practice, the duality of ‘home’ and ‘homeland’ was not represented in this questionnaire, because the two terms could not be distinguished in Ukrainian, so the comparison between the two sub-samples would not have been possible.

20 On December 5, 2004 a referendum was held in Hungary on two issues, one of them was the possibility to grant preferential naturalization for people who identify as Hungarian, but do not live in Hungary and are not Hungarian citizens. The referendum was accompanied by a fierce public debate, and the campaign’s intensity went far beyond previous referendum campaigns. Even though the referendum was invalid due to the low turnout, the instant burdened the relationships of Hungarian politics and Hungarians living beyond the border in the long run.

in the micro levels as well: 2% considered the place where they were born their home, and 2.9% the place where they were living at the time of research.²¹

Compared to previous researches, TANDEM 2016 data (Figure 5.) shows that the proportion of Transcarpathian Hungarians for whom Transcarpathia is the home has increased (62%), but the proportion of those who define Ukraine as home has declined (10%). The value associated with the place of birth and residence also increased compared to recent years. Hungary or the historic Hungary was selected as home by 8% of the respondents, which is roughly half of the data that the Carpathian Panel research identified.



*Figure 5: What do you consider to be your home?
(broken down by sub-samples, %)*

In the Ukrainian sub-sample, the emphasis is somewhat different: here, most of respondents, but still only every second person (50%) regards Ukraine as their home. Another 27% considers Transcarpathia as their home, and 7–7% the place where they were born or where they are living, respectively. There is also 2% in the Ukrainian sub-sample who consider Hungary their home.

In the chart, only the categories were included where the values exceeded 1% in at least one sub-sample. It is interesting that categories such as the Soviet Union, the Carpathian Ruthenia, or the Carpathian Ukraine did not reach this threshold, and nor did Europe. Our respondents do not consider these categories as alternatives to their home. Historical Hungary appears as home only in 3% of those completing the questionnaire in Hungarian.

21 Molnár and Orosz, "Kárpát Panel – Kárpátalja," 195.

A specific indicator of identity in Transcarpathia: what time is it?

An intriguing feature of Transcarpathian everyday life is reflected in the time zone that people adjust their clocks to; depending on their choice, their identity can be more related to the Central European or to the Eastern European region. The time used in Central Europe (CET), including Hungary, means +1 hour compared to the Universal Time Co-ordinated (UTC). In Eastern Europe (EET), including Ukraine, clocks are 2 hours ahead (UTC + 2). In Transcarpathia, “local time” corresponds to the Central European Time Zone (CET) according to the residents’ biological clock. However, the official time is one hour more (EET). So, when it is noon in Budapest, it is 1 pm in Kiev. In this situation, the measurement and expression of time for the Transcarpathians has become a kind of identity indicator; which time is being used at a given moment usually changes in a situational, speech and partner-dependent manner.

During our research, interviewers asked the informants before completing the questionnaire to tell them what time it was, claiming that they had to record the starting time of the completing. We specifically asked this question to get an automatic response, and to find out the time zone that the informants are adjusting to. In addition to writing down the exact time, interviewers also noted the time zone according to which they received the answer from the respondents.




Figure 6: Proportion of local and official (Kiev) time in the sample, in the Hungarian and Ukrainian sub-samples (N = 1202, %)

According to our data, the majority (55%) of the respondents used the “local” (CET) time, and a smaller proportion, 45%, used the official Kiev time (EET). This data in itself tells us that every second Transcarpathian, regardless of ethnicity, disregards the official Kiev time zone (Figure 6.).


There is a statistically significant difference ($p \leq 0,000$) between the two sub-samples: the use of the unofficial “local” (CET) time was almost twice as frequent among Hungarian respondents as among those who answered the questions in Ukrainian. According to the data, however, it can be stated that the unofficial “local”, i.e. Central European (CET) time is used not only by the Transcarpathian Hungarians, but also by a significant portion of the local Ukrainians (42.1% of our Ukrainian sub-sample).

Attitudes towards Ukraine

We have seen above that few Hungarians and Ukrainians thought that “Ukrainian citizen” was the best term to describe them. When defining ‘home’, we found that in the Hungarian sub-sample only 10%, and only half of the Ukrainian sub-sample thinks about Ukraine as their home. In addition, official Kiev time is used by only half (45%) of the Transcarpathians. What do the inhabitants of the westernmost county really think of Ukraine and how do they relate to this huge country²² with many linguistic-ethnic and historical fractures?

The questionnaire contained some statements that could help to better understand the attitude of the Transcarpathian Hungarians and Ukrainians to Ukraine. It is important to see that the opinions of the Hungarians and the Ukrainians differ significantly from each other in all of the statements listed here ($p \leq 0,000$). In the following, the values shown in the figure are analysed from bottom to top, and the averages of the values obtained on the four-degree scale are compared in the two sub-samples. The quadruple value of the four-degree scale is 2.5, that is, all the values above that are rather or very important to the informants, and what is under that are rather not or not at all important to them.

22 Ukraine’s total territory is 603 628 km². Its westernmost region, Transcarpathia is 12 777 km², which is 47 times smaller than the country’s territory, and has a peripheral location. For comparison, Hungary’s territory is 93 030 km².



*Figure 7: How much do you agree with the following statements?
(averages on a four-point scale, where 1 disagrees, 4 very much agrees)*

The greatest difference between Hungarians and Ukrainians can be found in the first statement, which said that informants would rather like to be Ukrainian citizens than citizens of other countries. While Ukrainians (2.92 average) strongly agree with this statement, the Hungarians (1.40) cannot identify with this statement at all. It is not unique that Hungarians underestimate their membership in the majority nation in the political sense, and tend to be open to other affiliations rather than belonging to the state of residence. Generally, it is more typical for the majority nation to have a positive and balanced cognitive structure about citizenship.²³ According to our research, the attachment of the Ukrainian majority seems to be loosening as well; it is a full unit behind from the highest positive point of the scale. The Carpathian Panel showed a more positive attitude towards Ukrainian citizenship: more than half of the respondents (58%) said that they would rather be Ukrainian citizens than citizens of other countries.²⁴ In 2016, 73% of the Hungarian respondents did not agree at all that they would rather be Ukrainian citizens than citizens of other countries.

The crises of the Ukrainian political leadership are faced also by people who are less familiar with politics at least because of the frequent early elections. Regardless of the suitability of the current political leadership, we were curious to see whether our informants

23 A similar result was found by another research on Hungarians in Romania and the Romanians. Cf. György Csepei, Antal Örkény and Mária Székely, *Nemzetek egymás tükrében. Interetnikus viszonyok a Kárpát-medencében. (Nations in the mirror of each other. Interethnic relations in the Carpathian Basin)* (Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 2002), 25.

24 Molnár and Orosz, "Kárpát Panel – Kárpátalja," 191–192.

would support the country where they live. In the Carpathian Panel, 75% of the respondents partially or totally agreed that people should support their country even if their leaders make mistakes. In the TANDEM survey, the dedication seems to be declining not only on the Hungarian side, but also on the side of the Ukrainians. The Hungarians (2.20) only slightly agree, the Ukrainians (2.82) agree a little more strongly that people should support their country even if their leaders make mistakes.

Assessing the war situation in the eastern part of the country was the basis for our next question. The questions asked whether all regions in the country should be united behind the conflict in eastern Ukraine, and whether this war is the war of the entire country. Our data show that the Hungarian and Ukrainian respondents have different attitudes towards this issue: Ukrainians tend to think of the war more as their own (2.82 average) than Hungarians (1.67).

The last statement addressed the root causes of the war: should Ukraine be more oriented towards Russia or the West? On this issue, the Ukrainian sub-sample does not agree at all that Russian orientation would be the solution to the problem (1.63 average). The Hungarian sub-sample slightly agrees with the orientation towards Russia (1.89 average).

Detecting ethnic space

Respondents of both sub-samples were asked to estimate the proportion of the Ukrainians, the Hungarians, the Russians and the Rusyns in the Transcarpathian population. At the last census in 2001, Ukrainians accounted for 80.5% of the total population of the county, while the largest national minority, the Hungarians, represented 12.1% of the population of Transcarpathia. In the TANDEM survey, respondents of the Hungarian sub-sample estimated their share in Transcarpathia nearly twice as high as the real proportion, 22% instead of the real 12%. The Ukrainian respondents also guessed the Hungarian community to be bigger: according to them, 19% of the population of Transcarpathia is Hungarian. Consequently, not only the Hungarians, but also the Ukrainians consider the proportion of the majority nation members in the county to be smaller than the actual number. The Hungarians only estimated the proportion of Ukrainians to 55%, the proportion of Russians to 11% and the proportion of Rusyns to 12%. The Ukrainian estimated their own proportion to 61%, the proportion of Rusyns to 12% and the proportion of Russians to 9%.

	According to the 2001 census	According to the Hungarian sub-sample	According to the Ukrainian sub-sample
Ukrainians	81	55	61
Hungarians	12	22	19
Russians	2.5	12	9
Rusyns	0.4	11	12

Table 3: Estimated ratio of Ukrainians, Hungarians, Russians and Rusyns by the respondents of the Hungarian and Ukrainian questionnaires

Although the last census took place more than one and a half decades ago in Ukraine, it is certain that nationality ratios have hardly changed since 2001.²⁵ The estimated proportion of Hungarians in our survey, which is much higher than in the real number, can be partly explained by the fact that Hungarians live in a bloc in a relatively well-defined area in Transcarpathia, therefore they see themselves as bigger—about twice as much—at the level of the total population of the county. The other reason is that the prestige of Hungary and Hungarians is increasing among the Ukrainians in the Transcarpathian region, thanks to the general economic and political uncertainty that results from the Russian–Ukrainian conflict. Another, differently focused analysis of the research data showed that Hungarian kin-state policy measures have been positively received by the Ukrainians as well.²⁶ The

25 In 2017, in the framework of SUMMA 2017 project, researchers tried to determine the number of Transcarpathian Hungarians. In the course of the research, demographic data were collected about 22,000 Hungarians in 111 Hungarian settlements. According to the calculations, the number of Transcarpathian Hungarians is currently 125,000. Adding to this value the number of Gypsies—who supposedly identify as Hungarians—we get the number of Hungarians in Transcarpathia: around 131,000. This can be compared with the 2001 census. The number of Hungarians in Transcarpathia decreased by 13.7% since 2001, which is a less radical decrease than the decrease of the other Hungarian communities in the Carpathian basin. Patrik Tátrai, József Molnár, István Molnár D., Katalin Kovály, Ágnes Eröss, Viktória Ferenc and Krisztián Rákóczi, “A migrációs folyamatok hatása a kárpátaljai magyarok számának alakulására” [The Impact of Migration Processes on the Number of Transcarpathian Hungarians]. *Metszetek* no. 1 (2018): 5–29.

26 Krisztián Rákóczi, “Magyar–ukrán kapcsolatok az egyén és a közösség szintjén, valamint a magyarországi támogatáspolitikai megítélése (Hungarian–Ukrainian relations at the level of the individual and the community, and the assessment of Hungarian support policy),” *Kisebbségi Szemle* no. 2. (2017): 65–84.

strong “Hungarian presence” that is present in more and more areas of local life can reinforce the image of the Hungarian community in Transcarpathia, and thus the Ukrainians perceive it to be larger than it is in reality.

Disadvantage and discrimination

The TANDEM 2016 research also examined whether the locals have experienced injustice. It found that most of the Hungarians were never discriminated against for their sex (94%), political views (85%), place of origin (79%), financial situation (72%), age (86%), social background (81%) or religious belief (83%). At the same time, one third (35%) of the Hungarian respondents said that they have been, although rarely, discriminated against because of their national belonging, while 10% of the respondents have frequently experienced injustice because of their being Hungarian. If we look at the responses of the Ukrainian sub-sample, we find that the proportions of discrimination experiences in all of the areas listed are lower than the data of Hungarians being discriminated for their nationality. 86% of the Ukrainians said they had never experience injustice because of their nationality, while 9% rarely and 4% often encountered this type of discrimination. In sum, Hungarian and Ukrainian respondents indicated more or less the same proportion of discrimination due to age (14% and 13% respectively), political view (14% and 16% respectively) and gender (5% to 5%). In the other four categories there are greater differences, and in each case the Hungarians reported higher levels of discrimination. Because of their religious beliefs, 17% of the Hungarians and 12% of the Ukrainians had a negative experience. 19% of the Hungarians and 9% of the Ukrainians were discriminated against because of their social background. The place of origin was marked by 21% of the Hungarians and 11% of the Ukrainians as a source of discrimination. Due to their financial situation, 27% of the Hungarians and 21% of the Ukrainians had experienced injustice, and this was the area that the Ukrainians indicated as a source of discrimination in the highest proportion. For the respondents of the Hungarian sub-sample, this was the category in which they experienced the second most negative experiences after nationality.

If we compare the above results with the results of the 2007 Carpathian Panel research, we see that in most areas the respondents reported a similar proportion of discrimination as they had ten years earlier. According to the data from the 2007 survey, Hungarians have never been subject to discrimination based on sex (94%), political views (77%), place of origin (84%), financial situation (70%), age (85%), social background (79%), religious

belief (85%), and nationality (49%). In the case of two categories, there is a significant improvement in the 2016 research: 8% fewer respondents reported having been discriminated against because of their political views, and 6% fewer reported negative experiences based on their nationality. However, place of origin was selected 5% higher than in 2007 as a reason for discrimination in 2016. There was no significant change in other areas.²⁷

Those who said that they had been discriminated against (even in just area) were asked to describe in what kind of situation or by what institution the discrimination happened. Respondents could mark more than one of the ten options listed. The respondents of the Hungarian sub-sample experienced the most discrimination in administrative situations (58%) and during health care services (46%). The respondents of the Ukrainian sub-sample were mainly discriminated against in their workplace (37%) and by their neighbours (36%).

Language use

The survey collected data about which language in which situations the informants use. They could select several languages for each sphere of language use, as in reality it is also possible to use two or more languages or a mixture of them in one situation. Therefore, the total value of the columns in Figure 8. will be higher than 100%. Based on previous researches we were aware that the use of the so-called Po-zakarpatsky, a local mixed dialect of Ukrainian, is present in the Transcarpathian linguistic space,²⁸ therefore the questionnaire specifically contained this option. The use of the Russian language is typical for about 10% of the respondents, and it does not typically differ in the two sub-samples.

The use of the local Ukrainian language version is more common in the Ukrainian sub-sample in all situations; except for language use in administration (here there is no significant difference in the use of the mixed language version in the two sub-samples). At the same time, it also appears that the local mixed language is the language of informal spaces: Ukrainians use this language with their neighbours (78%) and friends (75%) the most frequently.

27 Molnár and Orosz, "Kárpát Panel – Kárpátalja," 203.

28 Anita Márku, "Po zákárpátszki". *Kétnyelvűség, kétnyelvűségi hatások és kétnyelvű kommunikációs stratégiák a kárpátaljai magyar közösségben* ["Po zákárpátszki". Bilingualism, bilingual effects and bilingual communication strategies in the Hungarian community of Transcarpathia] (Uzhgorod: Líra Polygraph Center, 2013).




Figure 8: Language use

Hungarians use their mother tongue mostly with friends (87%), neighbours (85%), at work (79%) and shopping (77%). Hungarian is being used much less, only half of the time, at the doctor's office (57%) and in other offices (49%). Perhaps it is no coincidence that Hungarians experienced discrimination on the grounds of nationality in these two areas.

Relationships at the individual and community level

Respondents of both sub-samples were asked whether their circle of friends is homogeneous or rather heterogeneous in terms of nationality. Similar responses were given in the two sub-samples. 57% of the Hungarians mostly have Hungarian friends, and 39% have ethnically heterogeneous circle of friends. A very small proportion of the Hungarian sub-sample, 3%, stated that they mostly have non-Hungarian friends (Figure 9).




Figure 9: Friendships by nationality of the Hungarian sub-sample's respondents

In the Ukrainian sample 58% of the respondents said they are friends with people of their own nationality, and 38% reported of ethnically mixed circle of friends. The most significant difference in this question is that 6% less Ukrainians indicated that they only have friends who are of the same nationality as them than respondents of the Hungarian sub-sample.




Figure 10: Friendships by nationality of the Ukrainian sub-sample's respondents

As an indicator of tolerance towards each other, the Ukrainian and Hungarian respondents were asked whether they would accept people from the other nationality as residents of their settlement, employees, neighbours, friends, spouses and close relatives. In this question, Hungarian respondents showed more openness to the other nation: 92–95% of the Hungarian informants said that they would accept a Ukrainian as resident of the settlement, as a colleague, as neighbour and as a friend as well. As a spouse, 84% of the

respondents in the Hungarian sub-sample would accept a Ukrainian person. The respondents in the Ukrainian sub-sample would accept a Hungarian person as residents of their settlement, as their colleagues or as neighbours in a similar proportion as respondents of the Hungarian sub-sample. 87% said they would accept a Hungarian as a friend, but as a spouse or close relative, only 70% would welcome a Hungarian person. In comparison, the proportion of mixed marriages is 20% in reality.

We examined how respondents see the relationship between the majority nation and the Hungarians at the national (Ukraine), county (Transcarpathia) and settlement (where the informant lives) level. The data show that respondents in the Ukrainian sub-sample clearly see a better relationship between the two nations: they experience much less conflict in the relationship at the municipal, county and national levels than the respondents of the Hungarian sub-sample.




Figure 11: Assessment of the relationship between Hungarians and Ukrainians at settlement level




Figure 12: Assessment of the relationship between Hungarians and Ukrainians at county level




Figure 13: Assessment of the relationship between Hungarians and Ukrainians at national level

Ukrainian respondents thought in 8% that the coexistence of the two nations was burdened by conflicts at the national level, and in 7% that there are conflicts at the county level. In contrast, the Hungarian respondents in much higher proportion reported about conflicting relationships in all three levels. It is true for both samples, but much more obvious for the Hungarian sub-sample, that respondents' perception of conflicts increases from the settlement level to the national. At the settlement level, only 8% of the Hungarian respondents reported of conflicting relationship, at the county level, this proportion rises to 26%, and to 24% at the national level. Ukrainian respondents see the relationship between the Hungarians and the Ukrainians as more cooperative: at the settlement level 59% of them, in Transcarpathia 69% of them, and at national level 48% of them thought that the two groups cooperate. In the case of the Hungarians, it is clear that the wider the dimension of the relationship between the two peoples, the more negative the evaluation. In addition to the above-mentioned proportion of those who talk about conflict, the proportion of those who declare co-operation reinforces the previous statement: while 60% of the respondents in the Hungarian sub-sample spoke about co-operation, at county level this ratio was 47%, and at national level only 26%. The Ukrainian respondents consider the cooperation between the two nations to be the most positive at the county level. It is worth noting that both sub-samples had a high proportion, around 10%, of those respondents who did not know or did not want to assess the relationship between the two nations.²⁹

²⁹ Cf. Hires-László, *Az öreg fát*, 53–60.

Summary

In the total sample of TANDEM 2016, the overwhelming majority (81%) only identified a single identity, and 19% used the option of indicating dual attachment. It is interesting to note that the majority of those with multiple attachments can be found in the Ukrainian sub-sample: 15% of the Hungarian sub-sample and 21% of the Ukrainian sub-sample said that they have dual national belonging. For the identity of the Ukrainian sub-sample, belonging to the Ukrainian nation is the most decisive, followed by the regional "Transcarpathian" identity. In the case of Hungarians, regional attachment is complemented by belonging to an ethnic group, thus most of them identified as "Transcarpathian Hungarian". Attachment related to (Hungarian, Ukrainian, or dual) citizenship are far behind the ethnic and regional ties in the identity structures of the respondents. With regard to the knowledge of each other's language, the research showed that the Ukrainian knowledge of the Hungarians is slightly higher than the Hungarian knowledge of the Ukrainians. Theoretically, the level of self-reported language skills provides an opportunity for mutual dialogue, and the attitude towards each other's languages is positive as well (respondents would learn each other's language, and they consider it rather important for their children to learn the other group's language).

For the majority (62%) of the Transcarpathian Hungarians, 'home' means Transcarpathia, for 10% of them it is Ukraine, and for another 10% it is settlement where they were born. Half of the Ukrainian sub-sample considers Ukraine as its home, 27% Transcarpathia, and 7–7% the place where they were born, or the place where they are living. Compared to the results of previous researches on Transcarpathian Hungarians, the TANDEM project concludes that the ties of Hungarians to Ukraine have weakened, and regional ties have intensified.

Concerning the perception of ethnic space, the research found that respondents in both the Hungarian and the Ukrainian sub-samples perceive the Hungarian population of Transcarpathia much larger—about twice as large—than it is in reality. Discrimination does not significantly characterize the everyday life of the two ethnic groups, but respondents of the Hungarian sub-sample reported some negative experiences in the context of health care and administrative affairs. Nonetheless, these are the two areas where they have the least chance to use their mother tongue.

The research examined how respondents evaluate the relationship between the majority (Ukrainian) nation and the Hungarian minority at national, county and settlement levels. The data show that respondents of the Ukrainian sub-sample clearly see a better relationship between the two groups. Based on the results, it seems that the wider the dimension of the relationship between the two peoples, the more negative the evaluation.