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AUTONOMY IN SLOVAKIA – DIFFICULTIES AND PROBLEMS

This short presentation is focused on the issue of autonomy, its formulation, the evolution of concepts and the communication barriers it encounters in a very special environment – in the Slovak public and political discourse. Unlike in other countries, even in the Central European region, the topic of autonomy in Slovakia is widely ignored or deliberately misrepresented. The concept is missing both from the vocabulary and the concern of politicians for many reasons.

The concept of autonomy and the implementation of structural reforms in the state favoring minorities are widely seen in Slovak society only as an intermediate step towards changing, even disrupting the integrity of the state itself. For instance Ivan Gašparovič, the current president of the Slovak Republic in 2007 declared that autonomy has no „justification”.¹ Prime minister Robert Fico frequently states that the country needs to be more centralized, indirectly suggesting that even strong local self-government is not compatible with the ideology of the Slovak left-wing party Smer. The expression itself became the symbol of extremism, a topic which is not worthy of public discussion. In this short study I will focus on the main reasons of this situation, also suggesting possible solutions, dealing with the question, how to change the current state of public opinion.

A lesson in history

Above all, we need to raise the question, why is the Slovak society so unwilling to deal with the topic of autonomy? The reasons are numerous, but their source can be found mostly in history and historical circumstances. The negative attitude of society regarding autonomy (present even among the members of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia) is a result of numerous unsolved conflicts and prejudices. The conditions can be called historical because of their timelessness: they already existed before the Velvet Revolution and strongly influenced the nature of political representation in Slovakia.

¹ Gašparovič: *Autonómia nemá opodstatnenie (Autonomy has no justification)*. Pravda, 15 June 2007, retrieved from: <http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/154422-gasparovic-autonomia-nema-opodstatnenie/>.

Autonomy as a step towards independence

The concept of autonomy itself and the movement to achieve it is not an unknown phenomenon for the Slovak society, politicians and historians. The demand for territorial autonomy was the cornerstone of Slovak state building in the early 20th century, growing even stronger after the formation of the Czechoslovak state in 1918². The concept of Czechoslovakia was based on the idea of an artificially created Czechoslovak nation which consisted both of Czechs and Slovaks. It also endorsed the principle of a strong, centralized state. This kind of centralization has been widely seen as a measure which strongly favored the Czechs.

The concept of Slovak autonomy within the Czechoslovak state, however, was formulated even before the creation of the new republic itself. The Pittsburgh Agreement, which was the most important step towards creating the multinational Czechoslovakia, guaranteed Slovak autonomy, but contrary to this agreement the concept was not included in the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic.

From that point on the achievement of autonomy became the main objective and the political cornerstone of the clerical nationalist-fascist Slovak People's Party, which was later renamed Hlinka's Slovak People's Party. Parallel to the weakening of the Czechoslovak central state the HSPP gained more power and after the Munich Agreement of October 6, 1938 (in which the country lost a certain part of its territory to Germany) the executive committee of the party declared the autonomy of Slovakia within Czechoslovakia. The declaration was accepted and validated by the shattered and shaken central authorities. The adoption of autonomy was, however, just a temporary and short-lived solution. Due to the efforts of Germany the territory of Czechoslovakia was even further divided, and the state itself finally dissolved in March, 1939. Out of this dissolution first, independent Slovak state was born.

This historical background is necessary to understand the Slovak viewpoint derived from their own national experience. Accordingly, autonomy is paired with fear for the disintegration of the state itself; the concept is seen as a temporary solution which can be successful in solving ethnic problems only in the short term. just as in the case of Slovakia within the multiethnic First Czechoslovak Republic.

Autonomy as the "Hungarian" issue

Another main reason for the rejecting of autonomy by the Slovak society is that the demand was formed after the Velvet Revolution almost exclusively by members of the Hungarian minority and ignored by other minorities in Slovakia as well as by the representatives of the majority. For instance, in 2008 the representatives of the Rusin minority in Slovakia distanced themselves from autonomy concerns regarding the status of Rusins living in Ukraine.³ Only Hungarian politicians address the topic and the debate has a spe-

² Kováč, Dušan (Ed.): *Dejiny Slovenska* (History of Slovakia), 2nd ed. Praha: Lidove noviny, 2007.

³ *Slovenskí Rusíni: Právo menšín áno, autonómia nie* (Rights of Minorities Yes, Autonomy No). Aktualne, 28 October 2008, retrieved from: <http://aktualne.atlas.sk/slovenski-rusini-prava-mensin-ano-autonomia-nie/slovensko/>

cific overtone as a Hungarian-Slovak interstate conflict. Basically Slovak society perceives the debate about the autonomy as not taking place between citizens of Slovakia (with different nationalities), but only between the Slovaks and the Hungarians living in two separate states, mainly reflecting Hungarian nationalism.

The specific environment does not contribute to a meaningful exchange of ideas. The relationship between Slovakia and Hungary is still full of misunderstandings and mutual distrust between the two nations, affected by frequent border changes during the last century and occasional ethnic conflicts. This makes it significantly harder to talk about the autonomy for Hungarians in Slovakia.

Slovak society itself also knows very little about its own minorities and the diverse groups living in the country. The majority society cannot differentiate between the well-established Hungarian minority in Slovakia – basically Slovak citizens in need of solving their problems and demands within the state – and the Hungarians living in Hungary. This blurry difference is the source of many conflicts. The issues of Hungarian dual citizenship, the Benes decrees and even bilingualism are often presented as conflicts between two separate states which have no bonds to each other except the historical grievances. But the topic of autonomy (as well as the issues above) is primarily an internal affair of Slovakia that needs to be solved within the local community.

In reality Slovakia is, and always was a multinational state. According to the 2011 census approximately 458,000 Hungarians reside in Slovakia, and constitute 8,5 percent of the population. This number is probably even higher due to the high proportion of citizens with unknown nationality. The sheer numbers of the people belonging to one or another ethnic minority will continue to generate tensions, among them the demand for autonomy will resurface from time to time.

The Slovak political elite and the issue of the autonomy

In both the short and the long run the opinion of the Slovak political elite on the topic of autonomy seems extremely hard to change. The issue itself was never pressed by Slovak parties regardless of their ideologies. On the contrary, numerous politicians stood against possible changes and opposed the possibility of public debate, even in recent years.

In 2008 Robert Fico, the incumbent prime minister clashed with Pál Csáky, the president of the ethnic Hungarian party, SMK. After Csáky held an unofficial meeting with László Tőkés, a well-known Hungarian politician and MP in the European Parliament from Romania and discussed the possibility of autonomy in Slovakia, Fico publicly stated that Csáky “should not hurt Slovakia and Slovak-Hungarian relations”. The Slovak press interpreted the meeting as an appointment “touching an untouchable taboo”.⁴

Not only the representatives of socialist Smer party made similar resolutions. The president of the right-wing SDKÚ, former prime minister Mikuláš Dzurinda in 2009 stated „Everyone who is dreaming about territorial autonomy in Slovakia will once wake

spolocnost/

⁴ *Fico felszólította Csákyt, hogy ne bántsa Szlovákiát (Fico warned Csáky Not To Hurt Slovakia)*. Origo, 29 September 2008, retrieved from: <http://aktiv.origo.hu/nagyvilag/20080929-fico-felszolitotta-csakyt-ne-bantsa-szlovakiat.html>

up from their foolish and ridiculous dream”. Two years earlier Mária Sabolová (Christian Democratic Movement, KDH) claimed that autonomy is a topic which is „pulled out” only by the Slovak Nationalist Party (SNS) which is in need of getting into clashes with the Hungarian ethnic party.⁵

The Slovak Nationalist Party traditionally formulated the most radical statements. The party called for banning the SMK in 2004, after Zsolt Németh, member of Hungary’s cental-right Fidesz party told the press “that one of the main goals of the Slovak SMK party was to achieve autonomy in the south of Slovakia where the majority of the country’s Hungarian minority live”. The only initiative coming from the Slovak elite which was at least partially compatible with the Hungarian claims was the proposed bureaucratic reform of the Slovak liberals, the Freedom and Solidarity party (SaS).⁶

Historical lack of autonomy support

As previously mentioned, the Slovak nation had its own experience with autonomy and their politicians set this goal as an ultimate achievement at one point of the nation-building process. The Hungarian minority in Slovakia, however, had not considered this option as a viable one till the fall of the communist regime after the year of 1989. As a result, the need and the occasional political struggle for autonomy is a relatively new phenomenon within the Hungarian minority.

After the Treaty of Trianon and the border change in 1920 approximately 881,000 Hungarians found themselves in the newly created First Czechoslovak Republic. The disintegration of Austria-Hungary was a great shock to the members of the Hungarian community. The common local belief of the era was that the unjust treaty would be changed in the long run. As a result, even Hungarian politicians were considering other alternatives as acceptable solutions for the community – reforming the Czechoslovak state administration (what the local authorities aware of the instability of the multiethnic state were unwilling to do), or simply changing the borders. The logic behind the latter suggestion was justified by the First Vienna Award in 1938 which separated the southern, Magyar-populated territories from Czechoslovakia. Some contemporary Hungarian parties – the National Christian Socialist Party and later the Hungarian National Party, – however, actively endorsed the autonomist concept of Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party based on the belief that a possible administrative reform and the Slovak autonomy should strengthen the position of the Hungarian minority as well within the autonomous territory.

A decade later, the Hungarian inter-war political elite feared Slovak autonomist tendencies. This fear and distrust derived from the nature of Slovak-Hungarian relations and obviously affected the thinking of the Hungarian political elite. In the post Second

⁵ *KDH a SNS nechcú autonómiu južného Slovenska. (KDH and SNS Don’t Want South Slovakian Autonomy)*. Sme, 20 May 2007, retrieved from: <http://www.sme.sk/c/3305305/kdh-a-sns-nechcu-autonomiu-juzneho-slovenska.html>.

⁶ The Slovak Liberal Party worked out their own conception in 2011, however failed to thematise and implement it. The concept itself is based on the principle of creating natural regions in Slovakia.

World War Czechoslovakia the Czech nation and politicians were generally seen as a restraint which can balance Slovak nationalism within the state and thus protect the Hungarian minority.

A discussion for the potential autonomy of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, in contrast with Romania or Yugoslavia, never took place during the communist era. In addition there are many issues within the Hungarian community which need to be clarified. The Hungarian minority in Slovakia has no widely accepted intellectual-cultural center; the minority is geographically scattered along the 670 km long Slovak-Hungarian border. In addition the existence of a common Hungarian identity in Slovakia is hazy (whereas regional identities are still present and are very strong), and the regions inhabited by the Hungarian minority are connected only on an ethnic basis. To sum up, the different factors, both historical and sociological, have resulted in the relative diversification of the Hungarian opinion about autonomy in Slovakia.

Autonomy and the policy of minority parties

Because of the above mentioned, mostly historical reasons, support for autonomy was not very significant after the democratic transition in Czechoslovakia. The newly emerged Hungarian political parties needed to articulate their own policies regarding the topic. After the founding of the independent, second Slovak state in 1993 the question of Slovak-Hungarian relations (from the nationalist viewpoint the inviolability of the borders)⁷ became one of the most important issues that needed to be solved. The discussion about the rights of Hungarians in Slovakia was also a key issue.

The Hungarian parties after the Velvet Revolution were divided in their opinion on autonomy, but the introduction of the topic as a key issue was moderately successful. Whereas in 1990 only 7 percent of Hungarians had favored political autonomy, by September of 1993, 45 percent supported a fundamental political reorganization of the country.⁸ Slovak fears were fueled by the possibility of the emergence of another conflict-ridden territory, following the example of Nagorno-Karabakh or Yugoslavia. Hungarians, on the other side, feared that the new Slovak state – in which after the 1992 elections the nationalist SNS was participating in the government – would directly threaten their political and cultural existence and minority rights.

The ethnic parties themselves were always divided in handling and representing the issue of autonomy and the personal rivalries between the leaders of the three parties further deepened the inner conflict. The Hungarians did not agree with the government's administrative concepts, the vertically shaped districts in which the Hungarian

⁷ Vladimír Mečiar, the first prime minister of the newly formed Slovak state in October 1993 even accused Hungary of an arms buildup indicating that the ethnic tensions can escalate into an armed conflict. Four years later the third Mečiar government made an official proposal to exchange Slovak and Hungarian minorities between the two countries to assure the preservation of Slovakia's territorial integrity, which was turned down by the Hungarian authorities.

⁸ John T. Ishiyama, Marijke Breuning: *Ethnopolitics In the New Europe*. Boulder, CO, Lynn Rienner, 1998. 66.

communities' power was limited to participate only in local issues. The moderately center-right Coexistence Party emphasized cultural and territorial autonomy (the party itself formulated these demands back in 1991), the need for territorial autonomy was mentioned even by the party's biggest rival, the Hungarian Christian Democratic Party of Slovakia. The Hungarian liberals mostly opposed the administrative reorganization of the country. The concept of autonomy has not become the main focus of political discussion even after the Komarno declaration (see below) because of the overwhelmingly negative Slovak public response. The Coexistence party changed its position on autonomy and started to focus rather on the development of effective local governments.

The most important and visible declaration of autonomy happened five years after the Velvet Revolution. Ethnic Hungarian parliamentary representatives and local officials made a declaration in favor of autonomy on December 6, 1993, in Komarno, the town with the largest Hungarian population at that time in Southern Slovakia. Later on January 8, 1994, a mass meeting attended by 3,500 representatives of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia was held to concretize the plan.⁹ The proposal drafted at this meeting did not call for autonomy directly, it rather demanded a special status for areas dominated by ethnic Hungarians. This symbolic act, however, had no real influence on political representation; the Hungarian parties were in opposition and the government was unwilling to debate the topic. This was especially true during the semi-totalitarian and anti-Hungarian Mečiar government between the years of 1994 and 1998 when the nationalistic regime often used the "minority threat" to divert the attention of the public from more serious problems.

The Hungarian parties were forced to unite their power before the election in the year 1998 in reaction to changes in election laws. Vladimír Mečiar lost his power and influence in the next election and the Hungarian Coalition (SMK) became part of the governing coalition. The SMK faced a serious dilemma before taking part in the government: the Hungarian party for the first time since the establishment of the Slovak state had the chance to actively participate in decision-making, however, in exchange it had to give up openly demanding autonomy (According to the electoral program of the party from the year of 2002, it had to tone down the discussion of the Benes decrees and the issue of establishing an independent Hungarian university).¹⁰

After 1998 an open demand for autonomy has never appeared officially and directly in party documents or statements. The main driver of the process, Miklós Duray, former president of the Coexistence party and a symbolic politician of this era got marginalized within the SMK. Fifteen years later he is considered in the Slovak and even in the Hungarian society as a dividing personality, especially due to his personal conflicts with his political rivals, the new leaders of the unified Hungarian party (especially Béla Bugár).

⁹ Sherril Stroschein: *Ethnic Struggle, Coexistence and Democratization in Eastern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 214.

¹⁰ The involvement of the Hungarian SMK in the government was extremely important for the Slovak democratic opposition, the ethnic party provided the majority in the parliament over the nationalist parties. However, accepting the Hungarian demands was widely seen as a risk for the stability of the government itself.

Duray's personal authority has been significantly weakened and his position politically marginalized.¹¹

As a result of the above mentioned tendencies, the concept of a possible territorial autonomy in Slovakia has not been developed further. In addition, the Slovak interpretation of the concept – presenting autonomy as a dangerous, extremist solution which in the long run leads to independence and disintegration of the state – was consistently communicated by the extreme nationalist parties, especially Ján Slota's Slovak National Party (SNS). The constructive debate about autonomy was pushed to the side despite the fact that neither the position of the Hungarian language, nor the model of eight regional self-government units were providing a viable and satisfying solution for the Hungarian minority.¹²

No open demand for autonomy or a viable conception of changing the administrative structure of Slovakia has been formed since 1994, and not even after 2006, when the SMK lost its position in the government, did this change. From that point on the issue has been discussed by political adventurers and civil organizations rather than political authorities with real legitimacy. The most infamous case is connected to an NGO based on the agenda of autonomy, the Harmonia AT. The organization presented numerous statements regarding the topic, the activists and their goals generated interest of the Slovak media and various politicians. As a result the claims lacked political support and the issue was being thematized mainly by Slovak nationalists. In addition the principles of the organization founded in 2009 were written in the computer of a former agent of the Slovak secret agency, the SIS.¹³ The minor scandal had no major impact on domestic politics, however the Hungarian parties became even more concerned with the idea of standing up to 'untrustworthy' and relatively unknown civil autonomous movements. The official political leadership of the Hungarians avoids taking a stand on the issue. Within the SMK the issue is being articulated and only indirectly present in the party program. The newly emerged Híd party (from the year of 2010 the only Hungarian parliamentary party, formed by Béla Bugár a former president of the unified SMK) does not deal with the concept at all (although the possibility of personal autonomy, educational and cultural self-governance is present in the party's strategy adopted in September 2013).

¹¹ „With the absence of extremist politicians we cannot hear about the Hungarian problem. Just as Jan Slota needs Miklós Duray, Duray needs Slota” – commented political scientist Tomáš Koziak on the recent Hungarian-Slovak relations for aktualne.sk webportal. *Madarskú kartu mal v rukáve najmä Slota. Bez neho sa takmer nepoužíva.* (Hungarian Card was kept alive by Slota. Without him it has lost its relevance.) Aktualne.sk. 5 May 2013. Retrieved from: <http://aktualne.atlas.sk/madarsku-kartu-mal-v-rukave-najma-slot-a-bez-neho-sa-takmer-nepouziva/slovensko/politika/>

¹² Currently the Slovak regional system consists of eight regions (with their own regional parliaments and leaders) and 79 districts. The current regional system is a result of a political agreement of 1996 and later reformed in 2001. There is not a single region with a Hungarian majority. This structure is widely criticized, changing the regional system is a question which is frequently raised by Slovak parties. The governing Smer indicated the possibility of returning to the older, four-district system. From the Hungarian viewpoint the four- and eight regional variants are not acceptable. The regions are not reflecting natural regions and push the ethnic minorities into minority status even at lower administrative levels.


¹³ *Volt kém áll a Harmónia AT mögött? (Is there a former spy behind Harmonia AT?)* Új Szo, 20 May 2009, retrieved from: <http://ujso.com/online/kozelet/2009/05/20/volt-kem-all-az-autonomia-mogott-reszletek-a-csutortoki-uj-szoban>

The official electoral program of the SMK at the 2006 elections included a part about the necessity of strengthening the regional administrative units and autonomy in the field of education. The focus point, if any, is on changing the eight regional self-government units. In 2010 the party consistently used the phrase of „self-government”, and two years later the concept of autonomy was mentioned only once, as a reference to positive examples of local self-government in Western states. The election programs of the Híd party did not deal with the concepts and possibilities regarding autonomy until 2013.

The vicious circle – autonomy as a principle

As a result of historical events, the character of conflict between Slovak and Hungarian society and the formulation of the issue during the last 20 years, even the debate about the possibility of autonomy in Slovakia has reached a dead end. None of the prominent political actors is interested in discussing further possibilities of autonomy-application in the Slovak environment. We can call this phenomenon a particularistic „vicious circle”, in which all three participants mutually strengthen each other. The actors involved in the circle are politicians, society at large (involving the Slovak and the Hungarian), and the concept of autonomy itself.

THE VICIOUS CIRCLE



The meaning of the circle can be understood as the following: due to the prejudices against autonomy in public debate, society itself shows a negative attitude towards it. The politicians are reserved to talk about the topic beyond generalizations and clichés, because their positive attitude would be widely seen as extremist and not compatible with democratic principles. The possibility of autonomy in Slovakia becomes unclear and vague, rather an idea, not a clear concept, because none of the actors is interested in discussing the topic, nor to fill it with substance.

In their own way, each of the actors is making a rational decision: the politicians do not want to enrage their voters avoid being seen as extremist, radical and dangerous thinkers. As a result, the willing, autonomy-seeking politician limits his ability to form coalitions and agreements with other parties and members of the political elite. Because of the lack of clarity and debate, society is not aware of the real pros and cons of autonomy and has a negative attitude towards it. The setback is the marginalization of the issue, the voters are more willing to support „moderate” politicians who avoid talking about autonomy.

Last but not least the most intriguing part of the formula is the concept of the autonomy itself. Due to the lack of social discussion based on factual knowledge during the past two decades society – the Hungarian and the Slovak as well – are interpreting autonomy rather as a package of ideological principles than as a viable solution that can be applied in Slovakia. From the Hungarian point of view autonomy is often seen as a „wonder tool”, which in the long run can solve all the problems connected to the self-preservation of the Hungarian community in Slovakia. Still, nobody analysed the practical problems and challenges connected to self-governance, the effectivity and the usefulness of applicable solutions. In the end, public support for autonomy is derived from faith and irrational beliefs rather than rational, professionally established conclusions. The Slovak viewpoint was analysed above: for Slovak society the concept of autonomy is unacceptable and potentially dangerous to the state as a whole. The source of this unwillingness among Slovaks, and blind faith in the case of Hungarians, is based on the lack of public discussion.

Finding the way out: a direct and an indirect approach

In light of the past and recent experiences observers could think that the issue of autonomy is practically undebatable in Slovak society. That also means that the chances of its application are also very slim. The concept itself became rather a symbol than a serious topic to analyze and talk about. There are, however, at least two partially viable solutions to overcome the difficulties.

Various actors of the Hungarian community – including the SMK, the only significant Hungarian party till 2009 – applied an evasive strategy which basically means changing the confrontative name of the topic. In public debates autonomy was most often referred to as 'self-government', a concept basically working on the same principle according to the presenters. The strategy of using the right words and evading the formula of autonomy is visible in the official communication of the party.

The support for the autonomy in the society is significantly lower than the support for self-government.¹⁴ The vicious circle is broken indirectly – by accepting the current negative attitude of public opinion and by replacing the phrase “autonomy” with a new one. The inevitable drawback of this solution is that the misconceptions about autonomy are not being dispersed. Sooner or later even the new concept must be confronted with the general negative attitudes within society.¹⁵

A potentially successful strategy involving the local NGO's can also possibly break the vicious circle. As we previously mentioned the position of society cannot be changed easily and the politicians are particularly careful when forming their opinion about the possibility of autonomy. The concept of autonomy, however, does not need to be articulated and clarified exclusively by politicians. The task of making sense of the topic in common debates is the responsibility equally of the Hungarian and Slovak intellectuals. The concept of autonomy needs to be reformulated in an easily understandable manner, concentrating on problems regarding its application. A widely recognized, professional debate is the best way to change the attitude of society and also to indirectly influence the standpoint of politicians. The work of local activists is also very important in this field; however, recent symbolic protests are rather concentrating on bilingualism and Hungarian language use.

Breaking the circle on the other hand is not an easy task; it demands a lot of attention, preparation, internal and external discussion within the elite. To ensure the success of tematizing autonomy it is necessary to communicate and even formulate the demands and possibilities with the involvement of members of the majority nation.

In conclusion, we can say that discussion of autonomy in Slovakia evolved differently from other countries in the region. Due to Slovak historical experiences, the exclusivity of the Hungarian dimension in the topic, or the fragmentation of other minorities made it popular only for a short period of time. Despite this the issue is still timely, but it is often seen as a „wonder tool” for the minorities which will solve their problems. Unfortunately in recent circumstances even the presentation of the topic represents grave risk for politicians and the concept itself has no real support even among the members of the minority. The circle can be broken by rebranding the concept or involving a wide range of intellectuals in a unified discussion. To ensure this goal, it is extremely important to see autonomy as a tool which, if applied in the right way, can help to preserve the minority, and not as an ultimate goal which solves all problems.

¹⁴ Miklós Duray: *A „felvidéki” magyarok és Szlovákia. („Upper-land” Hungarians and Slovakia.)* Felvidek.ma. 7 May 2013. Retrieved from: <http://www.felvidek.ma/nezopont/publicisztika/39440-a-felvideki-magyarok-es-szlovakia>

¹⁵ The SMK is also internationally committed to solve the issue. The party in 2008 became the member of the Council of Autonomy for Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin (KMAT), which deals with the possibility of enabling autonomy within the Hungarian ethnic regions. The council is a representational institution, its role is to represent the decisions of its members at international forums, especially in the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, or in the OSCE. Another international solution can be the so-called ‘Minority SafePack Initiative’ which would strengthen the rights and opportunities of minorities on the European level and could help the European Union to establish a framework for minority protection. Though the initiative was rejected by the European Court of Justice, FUEN (Federal Union of European Nationalities) appealed against the rejection of the initiative; the appeal was submitted in January 2014.